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ABSTRACT 
The European Union (EU) and United States (US) are the world’s two largest and most 
influential legal jurisdictions for corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The 
pressures of international economic competition have lead to a flurry of M&A activity in 
these locales in the post-Cold War period.  Given the economic impact and, in many 
cases, political sensitivity of some M&As, it has become critical that transatlantic 
regulators reach similar decisions with regard to M&A approval, denial, or modification.  
Incongruent decisions lead to uncertainty in the marketplace, and the possible loss of 
global economic competitiveness and respect for regulatory processes and outcomes.  In 
this paper, we explore the efforts made by the US and EU over the past two decades to 
enhance cooperation in merger policies and processes. We argue that, despite a couple of 
high-profile cases to the contrary, the US and EU have made great strides in reducing 
uncertainty in the M&A regulatory process by institutionalizing a series of formal 
agreements and working groups that have served to provide the foundation for a 
transatlantic merger environment that may serve as a model for cross-border regulatory 
cooperation in the 21
st
 century. 
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Introduction 
Since the late 19
th
 century, the gradual proliferation of national competition 
policies reflects the emergence and maturation of free market economies throughout the 
world. These competition policies—broadly including merger review, cartel and 
monopoly policies, and state aids—operate as regulatory tools to prevent anticompetitive 
business activity from undermining the benefits of competition in a domestic free market 
economy. However, as economies become global and interdependent, the implementation 
of competition policy is no longer simply a within-the-border matter of regulating 
domestic business activity. 
The European Union’s (EU) active involvement in high-profile, cross-border 
merger cases raises questions about the EU’s approach and decision-making in the 
regulation of business activity that is becoming increasingly international. This article 
provides an investigation of the EU’s external merger relations with another large and 
influential economy, the United States of America (US). While transatlantic merger 
relations are not wholly without disputes, a review of merger cases since the launch of the 
EU’s single market in January 1993 suggests that the relationship is not trending toward 
increasing conflict, as is often portrayed in the media.
i
 Rather this article argues that the 
two most prominent trends in the relationship since the 1990s are cooperation and 
convergence. Cooperation is viewed herein as increasing coordination (largely via 
consultation and information exchanges) while convergence is understood to be 
increasingly reaching similar decisions on individual competition cases as well as 
increasing the similarity of procedural approaches and substantive rules in both 
jurisdictions. Thus, while cooperation and convergence may be mutually reinforcing, 
they are not identical phenomena. 
To explain the development of transatlantic merger relations, we consider the 
influence of economic interdependence as a significant factor that expands markets and 
changes business activity. As businesses—through the expansion of trade and 
investment—increasingly operate and merge across borders, so too does the need 
increase for regulators in different jurisdictions to review and approve, modify, or reject 
cross-border mergers. This pressure of interdependence, and particularly the trade and 
investment flows by European and US companies into each other’s home markets, led to 
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the signing of the 1991 EU-US Bilateral Competition Agreement, which formalised the 
transatlantic cooperative framework for merger review. 
However, in 1997, the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger dispute 
became the first major challenge to the transatlantic cooperative framework. The lessons 
from this case helped to shape the subsequent transatlantic approach to merger relations, 
an interactive process largely undertaken by the competition regulators themselves. 
Today’s framework is notable for the various ways in which the EU and US exchange 
information and coordinate their investigations throughout the review process. In addition 
to this increasing cooperation, transatlantic merger relations also display evidence of 
convergent decisions in individual merger cases, as well as procedural convergence in 
areas under the discretionary authority of the competition regulators. 
The article proceeds in the following manner. The next section discusses the 
influence of interdependence on EU-US merger relations and identifies the prominent 
trends—cooperation and convergence—in this relationship. The article then investigates 
the formal developments through which the EU and US have pursued cooperation in 
transatlantic merger relations. This section also discusses the role of the BMD merger in 
this cooperative process, serving as a spur to nudge regulators to improve cooperation so 
as to avoid similar disputes going forward. The article then turns to a discussion of the 
ways in which the competition authorities cooperate and pursue convergence across the 
four stages of merger review. This section introduces preliminary evidence of 
convergence and argues that these changes are taking place primarily under the 
discretionary authority of the regulators. The article concludes with a summary of the 
findings and suggestions for further research. 
 
Transatlantic Merger Review and the Pressure of Economic Interdependence 
Transatlantic efforts to cooperate in merger review help to meet an external 
challenge—economic interdependence—to domestic competition policy. In a globalizing 
environment, businesses rapidly internationalize their activities and competition 
authorities find that internationally-oriented merger activity increasingly threatens to 
outpace their legal and administrative resources to enforce domestic competition policy. 
Because economic interdependence increases the number of internationally-oriented 
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mergers, it also increases the potential for divergent regulatory decisions by EU and US 
competition authorities when they review the same merger. 
Economic interdependence challenges conventional notions of jurisdiction based 
on sovereign territory (Keohane and Nye: 1989). More specifically, it changes the context 
in which regulators act by increasing their need to enforce competition policy on firms 
that may not be based in their domestic jurisdiction. John Parisi, Counsel for European 
Union Affairs in the International Antitrust Division of the FTC, succinctly explained the 
nature of the problem: 
 
As business concerns have increasingly pursued foreign trade and 
investment opportunities, antitrust compliance issues have arisen which 
transcend national borders and have led antitrust authorities in the affected 
jurisdictions to communicate, co-operate, and co-ordinate their efforts to 
achieve compatible enforcement results (1999: 133). 
 
The challenges of economic interdependence and the responses needed are clear to 
competition regulators who wish to avoid political intervention in their review of mergers 
(Damro 2006: 82-83; European Commission 2001: ICPAC 2000: 63). This preference, 
which is shared by competition officials in both the EU and US, is reflected in the desire 
to achieve compatible enforcement results (i.e., convergent decisions) in individual cases 
that are investigated simultaneously. Such claims benefit from further clarification of the 
precise reasons why, in an interdependent environment, EU and US competition 
authorities will choose to pursue cooperation and convergence. 
First, competition authorities will seek to increase cooperation in order to increase 
information acquisition. As Devuyst argues, “information central to the [competition] 
investigation is often located outside the jurisdiction of the competition authority… 
Without the necessary proof, competition authorities are unable to take remedial action” 
(2000: 323). In an interdependent environment, the problems created by information 
asymmetries in cross-border merger cases present real challenges to the effective 
enforcement of domestic competition policy. 
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The centrality of information provides merging firms with an opening to influence 
cooperation. Domestic EU and US laws create this opening by providing for the 
protection of confidential business information in the merger review process. If firms do 
not waive their rights to confidentiality in merger cases, cooperative analyses can be 
seriously hindered. Citing the obstacles created by domestic confidentiality provisions, 
the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC), formed in the late 
1990s by the US Department of Justice to address 21
st
 century global antitrust issues, 
argued 
 
These laws have a particularly significant impact on the merger review 
process, because much of the information used to analyze a proposed 
transaction comes from extremely sensitive, confidential information 
relating to the companies’ strategies, investment plans, and marketing goals 
and methods. It is this information that frequently proves most useful in 
analyzing a proposed transaction (2000: 65). 
 
A series of transatlantic agreements on competition policy (see below) explicitly 
recognize and respect domestic laws protecting confidentiality. As a result, competition 
regulators must obtain waivers from the merging firms before sharing confidential 
information with their foreign counterparts. Such waivers of confidentiality have become 
routine in EU-US cooperation in merger review (Svetlicinii: 2006). This is so because, by 
waiving rights of confidentiality, firms expedite the review process and increase the 
likelihood of regulators reaching convergent decisions (Parisi 1999: 140). Merging firms 
generally prefer avoiding delays in the review process due to the time sensitivity of the 
transaction. Similarly, merging firms generally prefer convergent decisions on remedies 
(if remedies are necessary) because disagreements over such matters can delay the 
conclusion of the merger or undermine the strategic rationale of a proposed merger, 
resulting in its abandonment (Fox 2007; Morgan and McGuire 2004). 
The second reason why competition authorities will cooperate internationally 
when implementing competition policy is to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. 
Regulators will strive for convergent decisions because divergent decisions are often 
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perceived by politicians as threats to national sovereignty and/or their domestic 
constituents’ interests. Such decisions, therefore, can prompt political intervention 
(Schaub 2002: 11; Monti 2000: 2).  Divergent decisions also create uncertainty for firms, 
since it becomes less clear how antitrust regulators may rule in future cases, thereby 
hindering merger activity. 
Linked to this increase in convergence of decisions is also the possibility of 
procedural and substantive convergence. The procedural and substantive convergence of 
approaches is crucial because, as Charles S. Stark, Chief of the Foreign Commerce 
Section in the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, argues: 
 
Divergent antitrust approaches to the same transaction undermine 
confidence in the process; they risk imposing inconsistent requirements on 
the firms, or frustrating the remedial objectives of one or another of the 
antitrust authorities; and they may create frictions or suspicions that can 
extend beyond the antitrust arena—as we witnessed in the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas matter (2000: 5). 
 
Procedural convergence is linked to cooperation and information exchanges when 
it is understood as the increasing similarity of measures for collecting, evaluating and 
sharing information in individual competition cases. Likewise, substantive convergence 
of merger rules may affect cooperation if those rules apply to the various uses and ability 
to exchange information. As Devuyst argues, there is a natural link between cooperation 
and substantive convergence because “divergences in the laws applicable to the same set 
of facts may result in conflicting conclusions as to the legality of the behavior under 
review…. Cooperation is thus seen as necessary to reduce the likelihood of such 
conflicts” (2000: 323). The logic follows that as competition regulators increasingly 
employ similar procedures – for information exchange as well as timetables, investigative 
techniques, and notification procedures – and substantive rules and assessment criteria, 
the likelihood increases that they will reach a similar decision on the same merger case 
(Damro 2006, 872). An increase in such outcomes bolsters the trend of increasing 
cooperation. 
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Convergence of decisions follows directly from the activities of the competition 
authorities and falls largely under their discretionary authority. However, procedural and 
substantive convergence can be more difficult to achieve because—unless the rule in 
question falls exclusively under the discretionary authority of the competition regulator—
they may require an adjustment to legislation by law-makers (i.e., politicians). This 
article will investigate below the four stages of the merger review process through which 
substantive and procedural convergence may occur in transatlantic merger relations. 
According to Devuyst, the final reason why competition authorities will cooperate 
internationally when implementing competition policy is to reduce duplication of work 
(i.e., various investigative efforts). As Devuyst argues, “cooperation would help to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of work and costs, both for the competition authorities involved 
and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review” (2000: 323). While an 
important motivation for international cooperation, this reason is less important in merger 
cases than in non-merger cases (Devuyst 2001: 140). In merger cases, some duplication 
of work in the review process is mandatory due to domestic law requiring each authority 
to act under certain circumstances. The competition regulators are not allowed to 
determine at their own discretion whether or not they will initiate a particular merger 
review. Rather, they are statutorily required to open investigations when a merger 
transaction meets thresholds established in domestic law. As soon as proceedings have 
been opened, duplication of work occurs as the competition regulators seek identical 
information for their respective merger reviews. 
In summary, the primary motivations for competition regulators in cross-border 
merger relations are to increase cooperation via information exchanges and to reduce the 
likelihood of divergent decisions (i.e., increase convergence). Devuyst’s third reason—to 
reduce duplication of work—is less important in merger review due to domestic laws 
requiring competition regulators to review the same merger. In addition, these reasons 
also support the argument regarding the pressure of economic interdependence and a 
contention that competition regulators prefer pursuing cooperation and convergence via 
their discretionary authority. The next section investigates the formal agreements that 
provide the basis for claiming cooperation as a prominent trend in transatlantic merger 
review. 
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The Pursuit of Cooperation in Transatlantic Merger Relations 
The 1991 signing of the EU-US Bilateral Competition Agreement established the 
basic cooperative framework between competition regulators on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The agreement formalized coordination, emphasized information exchanges and 
introduced the principle of comity. Agreeing that divergent competition decisions needed 
to be avoided, the central components of the agreement include: 
 Notification when competition enforcement activities may affect the 
“important interests” (Art. 2, Para. 1) of the other party; 
 Exchange of non-confidential information; 
 Coordination of action; 
 Conduct of enforcement activities, “insofar as possible” (Art. 4, Para. 3), that 
are consistent with objectives of the other party; and 
 Consultation.ii 
Under the agreement, the exchange of information can take place at multiple 
stages of competition investigations. In individual cases, competition authorities will 
notify each other when they begin reviewing a case that may affect the other’s important 
interests (i.e., comity). These notifications are made “far enough in advance… to enable 
the other Party’s views to be taken into account” (Article 2). Following such an initial 
notification, further cooperation can occur in the investigative and remedial stages of the 
case. The regulators acknowledged the constraints of their respective domestic legislation 
by agreeing that “Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner inconsistent 
with the existing laws, or as requiring any change in the laws, of the United States of 
America or the European Communities or of their respective States or Member States” 
(Article IX). 
Despite the 1991 Bilateral Agreement, transatlantic merger relations experienced 
a significant flaw in the cooperative framework in 1997. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
(BMD) merger case provoked considerable attention because it involved a merger 
between two large US firms that was challenged in the EU but approved in the US. The 
EU’s divergent decision and the subsequent US reaction surprised many observers in 
Brussels and Washington and contributed to the high-profile character of the case. 
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However, the escalation of the case should not surprise observers because such a 
divergent decision by competition regulators is likely to be perceived as a threat to 
national and/or constituent interests and, therefore, should prompt political intervention. 
In the end, the BMD merger was particularly significant because of the escalation of 
political intervention and also because it served as a valuable learning experience for both 
EU and US competition regulators.
iii
  
This case began when Boeing Company and McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
(MDC), two US aerospace companies, announced plans to merge on December 15, 1996. 
In accordance with the provisions of the EU-US Bilateral Agreement, and following the 
receipt of formal notification from the merging firms, the EU and US competition 
regulators notified each other that they were both opening their own investigations into 
the BMD case. 
Following a preliminary investigation, the Commission announced its intent to 
open an in-depth investigation on March 17, 1997. On May 21, the Commission issued 
its formal Statement of Objections, which outlined its concern that the merger would 
strengthen Boeing’s existing dominant position. At this point, the US’s Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) was unable to comment on the merger because its review was still 
ongoing (White House 1998). 
The EU’s Statement of Objections included concerns over the impact of the 
merger on competition in the defense industry. However, following a communiqué from 
the US requesting comity considerations, the Commission agreed not to investigate the 
defense related portions of the merger. In accordance with the Bilateral Agreement, the 
Commission’s decision reflected a determination that this aspect of the merger 
represented an “important interest” of the US. The fact that the EU dropped its defense 
related complaints suggests that the Commission calculated that including such a 
politically sensitive subject as defense would have increased significantly the likelihood 
of political intervention from the US (i.e., White House and Congress). 
On July 1, it became apparent that the decisions of the EU and US competition 
regulators were diverging significantly. On that day, the FTC approved the BMD merger. 
According to the FTC’s analysis, the merger would not raise significant competition 
concerns because MDC was no longer competitive in the commercial transport market 
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(Sparaco 1997: 67).  In the hopes of gaining similar approval in the EU, BMD submitted 
a new package of remedies to the Commission. This package was rejected by the 
Commission. 
Facing an intransigent Commission and with a final decision in the case scheduled 
for July 23, US politicians began to intervene in the process with threats of retaliation. 
Once it became clear that the EU would not approve the merger without remedies (i.e., a 
divergent decision), the White House intervened with President Bill Clinton stating that 
he might consider a complaint to the World Trade Organization or retaliatory tariffs if no 
resolution was reached. The US legislature also intervened in the review process. Both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions opposing EU 
“interference” in a US business transaction.iv On July 16, the US Senate unanimously 
approved a resolution that condemned the EU for its intentions (Wolf 1997). 
For their part, Boeing and MDC continued to resist the demands of the 
Commission despite a fast-approaching deadline for a final decision. Finally, facing the 
reality that the EU was not going to change its decision, the merging firms contacted the 
Commission with a solution on July 23. Boeing Chairman and CEO, Philip Condit, 
argued that BMD’s concessions were made due to a fear that the newly merged company 
would have faced “large fines and potential harm to our customers” without EU approval 
(Boeing 1997: 1). The Commission accepted the final package of remedies offered by 
BMD, which addressed each of the EU’s competition concerns.v Formal EU 
authorization of the merger came on July 30. The newly-merged BMD began operating 
on August 4 as the largest aerospace company in the world (Damro 2001: 215). 
The BMD case provides useful evidence and insights regarding divergent 
decisions and political intervention. The case supports claims that politicians are likely to 
perceive divergent decisions as threats to national and/or constituent interests. Based on 
this perception, US politicians decided to intervene in the case. In addition, this case 
served as a valuable learning experience for many actors involved in the merger review 
process. While the Bilateral Agreement had been signed six years prior, the competition 
regulators’ experience at cooperating under the provisions was still limited and untested 
with respect to contentious and high-profile cases like BMD. As Parisi argues “some 
misunderstandings of the Agreement were reported, particularly during the course of the 
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[BMD] merger case… One such misconception was the assertion that, in a merger 
notified to both parties, one party ‘goes first’ while the other defers. This is clearly 
wrong… (1999: 137). Stark also noted the valuable lessons learned from BMD, noting 
that the “experience led the agencies on both sides to draw a deep breath and commit 
themselves to extra and sustained efforts to make the coordination process work as well 
as it possibly can” (2000: 5). These lessons were not lost on subsequent EU-US 
cooperation. In fact, after BMD, the US and EU competition regulators began exchanging 
information and discussing mergers sooner and more intensively in their respective 
review processes.
vi
 
After the BMD case, the EU and US competition regulators agreed the 1999 
Administrative Arrangements on Attendance (AAA).
vii
 The AAA reflects the regulators’ 
perceived need to formalize and clarify procedures that were already taking place on an 
ad hoc basis under the Bilateral Agreement.
viii
 In their respective competition 
investigations, EU and US regulators often meet with the merging firms and third parties 
to collect information on business activity related to the merger. As a result of this 
previous experience, the Commission approached the US competition authorities to 
establish a clear framework for requesting attendance at each other’s meetings. 
Based on the AAA, reciprocal exchanges of attendees became a common feature 
of the review process for concurrent jurisdiction competition cases. As Commissioner 
Monti argues ‘it has now become standard practice for representatives of the antitrust 
agencies to attend oral hearings in cases involving close EU-US cooperation—a virtually 
unprecedented step forward in EU-US regulatory cooperation’ (Monti 2001b: 3). 
When requests for attendance are granted, the prevailing laws protecting 
confidential information in the host jurisdiction apply to the guest regulators. As such, the 
host competition authorities will typically consult with the merging firms before an 
arrangement for attendance is confirmed. Unless the firms have agreed to waive their 
right to confidentiality, guest competition regulators are asked to exit the meeting when 
confidential information is being discussed. As such, the AAA does not threaten domestic 
laws on confidential information and conforms to general business interests on both sides 
of the Atlantic. By simplifying the procedure for attendance into a standard practice, the 
AAA reduces information asymmetries and, again, reduces the likelihood that 
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competition regulators will reach divergent decisions.
ix
 By reducing the likelihood of 
divergent decisions, the AAA (like the Bilateral Agreement) also reduces the likelihood 
of political intervention. 
In 1999, the EU and US also established of the EU-US Mergers Working Group 
(MWG). This cooperative group is an ad hoc forum with flexible membership that is 
mandated to study different approaches in the EU and the US to the formulation of 
remedies and the scope for convergence of merger analysis and methodology. The MWG 
was created under the regulators’ discretion with an agenda that can vary depending on 
regulatory needs for new areas of cooperation. 
In 2002, the MWG established three sub-groups, one to deal with procedural 
issues and two others to deal with substantive issues on the conglomerate aspects of 
mergers and the role of efficiencies in merger analysis. These cooperative efforts resulted 
in the guidelines on Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations. The 
guidelines were issued ‘with a view to minimising the risk of divergent outcomes, as in 
the BMD case, and to enhancing the good relationship developed over the last decade’ 
(European Commission 2003: 5). The guidelines identify central objectives and four 
specific areas—coordination on timing, collection and evaluation of evidence, 
communication between the reviewing agencies and remedies/settlements—in which 
cooperation and convergence will reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions in 
individual merger cases.
x
 
In October 2011, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division and the European Commission published revised best practices for 
cases where EU and US competition authorities were reviewing the same merger (US-EU 
Merger Working Group 2011). These new guidelines address four particular areas and 
indicate further areas for increasing cooperation and convergence. First, procedures for 
communications are to include early contacts, possible alignment of consultation 
timetables at key stages, and the designation of a contact person in the EU and US. 
Second, improvements on coordination of investigatory timing include encouraging 
merging parties to discuss and facilitate timings for submission, and actively warning 
merging parties against filing and gaining a decision in one jurisdiction before the other. 
Third, the collection and evaluation of evidence includes sharing of information during 
  12 
the initial (pre-notification) stages, the discussion and coordination of information or 
discovery requests, and discussions with a view to receiving confidentiality waivers from 
the merging parties (and possibly third parties). Finally, regarding remedies and 
settlements, the new guidelines emphasise the need to avoid divergent decisions: ‘The 
reviewing agencies should strive to ensure that the remedies do not impose inconsistent 
or conflicting obligations on the parties’ (2011: 6). 
To summarize, the EU and US have devised a series of agreements and initiatives 
over the past two decades in an effort to increase cooperation and convergence in ways 
that increase the likelihood of reaching similar merger decisions. The 1991 Bilateral 
Agreement was an important but insufficient first step, possibly because it did not foresee 
the impact that economic interdependence would have on international business during 
the 1990s, or the pace at which firms would respond to accelerated global competition. 
The 1999 AAA formalized cooperative procedures that regulators already had initiated 
following the Bilateral Agreement and, especially, after the BMD merger. At about the 
same time, the MWG was created in an effort to assess ongoing needs and areas for 
improvement, basically acknowledging that interdependence would accelerate merger 
activity and that US and European companies would be at the forefront of such activities. 
Finally, the 2011 best practices publications aimed to fine-tune data collection procedures 
and further improve cooperation between US and EU merger regulators.  
 
The Process of Cooperation in Transatlantic Merger Relations 
Under the cooperative framework discussed above, the EU and US competition 
authorities engage in behavior designed to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions in 
individual merger cases. This behavior reflects the concern of the regulators that 
divergent decisions are typically perceived by politicians as likely to affect adversely 
their national and/or constituent interests (Damro 2006). If politicians form this 
perception in individual merger cases, their likelihood of intervening increases. 
In general, the record of individual merger cases suggests that EU-US cooperation 
has met the challenge of economic interdependence. While official commentators on both 
sides of the Atlantic frequently declare the success of EU-US cooperation in merger 
review,former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky argued early on that, 
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[I]t is hard to imagine how day-to-day cooperation and coordination 
between enforcement officials in Europe and the United States could be 
much improved. Within the bounds of confidentiality rules, we share, on a 
regular and continuing basis, views and information about particular 
transactions, coordinate the timing of our review process to the extent 
feasible, and almost always achieve consistent remedies (2000). 
 
Beyond this general assessment, it is useful to investigate in greater detail the process 
through which actual EU-US cooperation takes place under the agreements identified in 
the previous section. The increasing information exchanges that occur through this 
process increase the likelihood of convergence in decisions. This process can be broken 
down into four stages: initial contacts, notification contacts, review process contacts, and 
remedial contacts. 
 
Initial Contacts 
Transatlantic cooperation takes place in merger cases that meet statutory 
thresholds found in the US’s Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) and the EU’s Merger Control 
Regulation (MCR). When mergers meet these thresholds, the firms must notify both the 
US and EU competition authorities of their intent to merge. Most EU-US cooperation 
occurs after the competition authorities have received such formal notifications from the 
firms. However, as detailed in the 2011 US-EU Merger Working Group best practice 
guidelines, cooperation may begin even before merging firms submit a formal 
notification to the respective competition authorities. The guidelines, in fact, encourage 
companies to take proactive steps, since “effective coordination between the US agencies 
and DG Competition depends to a considerable extent on the cooperation and goodwill of 
the merging parties” (2011: 2). 
During the merger review process, EU and US competition authorities are in 
contact with each other on a daily basis via telephone calls, faxes, emails and face-to-face 
interactions (Janow 2000: 44). This is particularly true of lower-level case managers and 
handlers who focus on the economic and legal analysis of the merger review process. 
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During these contacts, individual case managers and handlers may, and often do, discuss 
pending mergers that have not yet been formally notified to one or both of the 
competition authorities. These discussions must avoid concrete details because the 
regulators take great care not to broach confidentiality requirements during such informal 
initial contacts. 
Initial contacts can function as an early warning system for possibly divergent 
analyses between EU and US competition regulators. For example, in order to respect 
confidentiality requirements, EU and US competition authorities may engage in 
hypothetical discussions over market definitions and other analytical concepts of merger 
review that may apply to individual merger cases soon to be notified. By discussing 
market definitions and analytical concepts, even hypothetically, before receipt of the 
formal notification, the regulators can alert each other to the potential use of different 
approaches to evaluating a merger that could lead to divergent decisions. Of course, if the 
firms proposing a merger agree to waive their rights to confidentiality, initial contacts 
need not be limited to hypothetical discussions. The 2011 best practices encourage this, 
contending that “Agency cooperation is most effective when the merging parties and 
third parties allow the agencies to share information” (2011: 2). Further, the success of 
US-EU cooperation “depends on the active participation and cooperation of the merging 
parties and will be facilitated if the parties discuss timing with the reviewing agencies as 
soon as feasible after the parties inform the reviewing agencies of a merger that requires 
review by the US agencies and DG Competition” (2011: 4). 
Initial contacts can significantly expand the competition regulators’ discretion 
because they allow information exchanges prior to opening the formal procedures for 
cooperation. Because regulators can discuss expected mergers and exchange information 
prior to the firms’ formal notification, initial contacts also increase discretionary 
flexibility regarding the strict statutory procedures (including formal deadlines) embodied 
in the HSR and MCR. 
 
Notification Contacts 
The next stage of cooperation is characterized by notification contacts. These 
notification contacts are typically formal, written exchanges between the competition 
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regulators. As such, they should not be confused with the formal notifications that 
merging firms are required to submit separately to the regulators pursuant to the HSR and 
MCR. 
Notifications occur when one regulator informs the other that it is initiating a 
competition investigation that may affect interests in the foreign jurisdiction. These 
notification contacts are explicitly mentioned in the EU-US Bilateral Agreement and the 
Guidelines on Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations. The cooperation is 
triggered when merger review by one jurisdiction may affect the “important interests” of 
the other jurisdiction. Article II.2 of the Bilateral Agreement includes a number of 
circumstances that ordinarily trigger implementation cooperation, and “thereby give each 
party the opportunity to determine the extent to which its important interests might be 
affected” (Parisi 1999: 136). The notification stage consists of more than a brief 
statement that a proposed merger requires approval from multiple regulators.  According 
to the 2011 best practices, “at the start of any investigation in which it appears that 
substantial cooperation between the US agencies and DG Competition may be beneficial, 
the relevant DOJ Section Chief or FTC Assistant Director and DG Competition Unit 
Heard…should seek to agree on a tentative timetable for regular inter-agency 
consultations, which takes into account the nature and timing of the merger” (2011: 3). 
 
Review Process Contacts 
Following the receipt of a formal EU-US notification, the competition regulators 
engage in a variety of cooperative contacts during their respective review processes. 
These review process contacts “can focus on any or all of the main issues likely to arise 
in the context of a merger investigation” (Monti 2001b: 2). Review process contacts 
include exchanges of information designed to reduce the likelihood of divergent 
decisions. More specifically, review process contacts frequently target substantive issues 
such as the definition of relevant product and geographic markets and the assessment of 
the likely competitive effects of the proposed merger on the relevant markets (European 
Commission 2000, 3). The best practices document proposes that “consultations are 
likely to be particularly useful at key stages of the investigation, including: (a) before the 
relevant US agency either closes an investigation without taking action or issues a second 
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request; (b) no later than three weeks after the European Commission initiates a Phase I 
investigation; (c) before the European Commission opens a Phase II investigation of 
clears the merger without initiating a Phase II investigation; (d) before the European 
Commission closes a Phase II investigation without issuing a Statement of Objections or 
before DG Competition anticipates issuing a Statement of Objections; (e) before the 
relevant DOJ section/FTC division make its case recommendation to senior leadership; 
(f) at the commencement of remedies negotiations with the merging parties; and (b) prior 
to a reviewing agency’s final decision to seek to prohibit a merger” (2011: 3). 
While review process contacts occur under the discretionary authority of the 
regulators, information exchanged during these contacts must respect the rights of 
confidentiality afforded to firms by domestic law. Competition regulators are very careful 
to respect relevant domestic statutes, which reduces the likelihood of political 
intervention. This feature of EU and US competition policies opens a potential avenue for 
firms to exert influence—by arguing for the maintenance of confidentiality—in 
concurrent jurisdiction merger reviews. The evidence suggests that firms have tried to 
avoid such controversy in recent years, since “confidentiality waivers have become 
routine practice in cases involving cooperation between DG Competition and the US 
agencies” (EU-US Mergers Working Group 2011: 6). 
EU and US competition regulators do not typically make public comments 
regarding their respective review processes or transatlantic review process contacts. 
Rather, they prefer (and in some cases are legally required by domestic law) that their 
respective review processes and transatlantic review process contacts remain confidential 
until they are prepared to announce publicly whether or not to approve a proposed 
transaction. Earlier publicity can lead to unwanted politicization of the merger review 
process. As such, regulators are encouraged to address potential problems and political 
fallout through discreet discussions at the highest levels: “Consultations between the 
senior leadership of DG Competition and their counterparts in the US agencies may also 
be appropriate at any time. The senior leadership of the reviewing agencies should be 
kept informed of key milestones throughout the investigation” (EU-US Mergers Working 
Group 2011: 3-4). 
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Remedial Contacts 
Remedial contacts occur when EU and/or US competition regulators determine 
that certain conditions will have to be met before final approval is granted to a proposed 
merger. While competition regulators may agree throughout the review process contacts, 
they may disagree on the precise nature of the remedies necessary for approval. Like the 
other stages of merger review, remedial contacts occur under the discretionary authority 
of the EU and US competition regulators. 
As the Commission argues, EU-US cooperation via remedial contacts is 
specifically in the interest of the firms involved: “co-operation in the devising of 
remedies can help [firms] avoid ‘double-jeopardy’ whereby they are required to negotiate 
remedies sequentially, and thus have to make further concessions to the second agency to 
secure the clearance of a deal which has already received the blessing of the first” 
(European Commission 1999: 4.2). While remedial contacts are important for merging 
firms, their importance for competition regulators is fundamentally based in the fact that 
disagreements over remedies can lead to divergent decisions, which may prompt political 
intervention. 
As with the other stages of merger review, the relationship between the 
competition regulators and merging firms is central to decreasing the likelihood of 
divergent decisions on remedies and settlements. The best practices guidelines make clear 
the essential role played by these different actors for increasing the overall effectiveness 
of cooperation in remedial contacts: “Cooperation is beneficial throughout the remedial 
process. Cooperating on the design of possible remedies may result in a single proposal 
for a remedial package to address concerns of both reviewing agencies… As effective 
cooperation… will depend significantly on the timing and the content of the merging 
parties’ proposals, the merging parties have an important role in enabling meaningful 
cooperation between the reviewing agencies” (EU-US Mergers Working Group 2011: 7). 
 While EU and US regulators have made great progress in enhancing cooperation 
and convergence across the four stages of the merger review process, it is worth noting 
that some challenges still remain.  Perhaps most important among the challenges are the 
obstacles created by institutional differences in domestic EU and US competition 
policies. For example, EU and US competition regulators may prioritize different 
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substantive objectives in their respective competition investigations, which can increase 
the likelihood of divergent decisions in concurrent jurisdiction competition cases. In 
practice, they can lead to substantive divergences in the definition of relevant product 
and/or geographic markets, which can result in dramatically divergent market analysis 
calculations and, ultimately, divergent competition decisions. Similarly, procedural 
differences embedded in domestic EU and US competition policies—such as different 
timetables for competition investigations, different evidence-gathering tools and different 
roles for the judiciary—can impede the transatlantic coordination of competition 
investigations (Damro 2005). 
Despite these domestic institutional differences in EU and US competition 
policies, some signs of convergence are emerging. Substantively, the overwhelming 
majority of transatlantic regulatory decisions in individual concurrent jurisdiction 
competition cases are convergent. Procedurally, limited convergence is also occurring. 
For example, the MWG’s work in the area of merger remedies has already produced 
practical results. Through the MWG, the Commission received useful comments from US 
competition authorities on a preliminary draft of its notice on remedies.
xi
 Commissioner 
Monti was candid in commenting on lessons learned from the US and the role of the 
MWG in the EU’s preparation of this notice: 
 
“I have no hesitation in acknowledging that the Commission’s approach to 
remedies as set out in the Notice was influenced by the FTC’s previous 
study on the divestiture process, which demonstrated that some remedies 
secured by the FTC had proved less effective than intended. Furthermore, 
the EU and US antitrust authorities discussed their respective approaches to 
remedies within the framework of a working group on merger control [i.e., 
the MWG]. The exchange of expertise in this group proved invaluable to 
the drafting of our Notice on remedies” (2002: 2). 
 
In addition to the successful convergence in the EU’s Notice on Remedies 
(European Commission, 2002; Monti, 2002), the MWG has also been credited with 
contributing to the US decision to publish the motivation of its decisions not to challenge 
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certain relevant actions (Monti, 2004; USDoJ, 2002). This evidence of convergence is 
notable in that it is not coercive or unidirectional, rather it follows from ‘a mutual 
learning process based on mutual experience’ (Damro 2011: 424). In addition, both of 
these instances of convergence occurred in areas under the discretionary authority of the 
competition regulators, not a change to the non-discretionary statutes governing 
competition policy.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has provided an analysis of US and EU efforts to promote cooperation 
in merger policy.  Economic interdependence has prompted EU and US regulators to 
engage in extensive and intensive cooperation in the implementation of merger reviews 
that affect both jurisdictions concurrently. This cooperation is undertaken primarily to 
enhance information acquisition and reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. A 
cooperative framework of negotiated agreements and ad hoc working groups, along with 
increasing cooperation across a number of practical stages of the merger review 
process—initial contacts, notification contacts, review process contacts and remedial 
contacts—has resulted in convergence in decisions and procedures, which has increased 
certainty and minimized political intervention and tensions. While different types of 
convergence have contributed substantially to increasing cooperation in transatlantic 
merger relations, there do remain important differences in EU and US merger rules. The 
extent to which further cooperation can overcome these differences will largely be 
determined by the work of the EU-US Mergers Working Group and the supporting 
contributions of merging firms in individual investigations and the negotiated framework 
more generally. 
The article argues that the EU and US regulators have a preference to make 
decisions (even divergent decisions) in merger review in accordance with their statutory 
mandates and without political intervention. In the words of former Commissioner Monti, 
such decisions should be “a matter of law and economics, not politics” (European 
Commission 2001). Thus, the efforts of transatlantic cooperation should be viewed in the 
wider context of economic interdependence, insofar as market-based competition pushes 
regulators to provide some degree of certainty in rulings to enable businesses to make 
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strategic decisions with a level of confidence that regulatory outcomes will not diverge 
across legal jurisdictions. 
The research in this article would usefully contribute to further work in several 
related areas.  The first is cooperation in other areas of competition policy.  M&As are an 
important part of competition policy, but so too are state aid and anti-competitive 
practices (e.g., cartels and price-fixing). US-EU cooperation is less developed in these 
areas, so an important area of research is to understand the factors that may have limited 
cooperation and convergence in these areas. 
Second, this article is concerned mainly with cooperation outputs, such as 
agreements, working groups, and formal policies.  We have not investigated in depth the 
inputs, specifically the roles that certain actors play in this process.  Companies, 
legislatures, national governments, and regulatory bodies themselves have their own 
interests in seeing certain forms of merger cooperation institutionalized – or not. 
Certainly, more work should be done to determine the influence of these various actors 
and to explain how and why cooperation takes the form that it does. 
Finally, the US and EU are not the only merger regulators that matter. With the 
rise of emerging markets throughout the world, companies often need to seek M&A 
approval from national regulators in, for example, Asia and Latin America. Cooperation 
among these other jurisdictions is not nearly as institutionalized as in the transatlantic 
relationship, and it is not at all clear how this process will unfold with and among other 
countries. 
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i For earlier examples of this cooperative trend, see Fox (2007); Barnett (2006); Monti (2004, 2001a); Pate 
(2004); James (2002, 2001); Schaub (2002); Melamed (2000); Gerber (1999). Regarding the occasional 
disputes, for a recent case of disagreement see the Sun-Oracle merger (2009). 
ii For a thorough analysis of the content of the Bilateral Agreement, see Ham (1993). 
iii More detailed reports of the substantive issues of the merger and the divergent analyses taken by the EU 
and US can be found in Damro (2001), Boeder (2000), ICPAC (2000), Van Miert (2000), Karpel (1998), 
Peck (1998), Fox (1997) and Snyder (1997). 
iv H.R. Res. 191, 105th Cong. (1997), 143 Cong. Record 5550 (1997); S. Res. 108, 105th Cong. (1997), 143 
Cong. Record 7609 (1997). 
v For the exact remedies, see Boeing (1997). 
vi This is not to claim that the cooperative framework was perfected following the lessons learned from 
BMD. For example, the GE-Honeywell merger (2001) is often identified as a subsequent case in which 
cooperation was less than perfect (Morgan and McGuire 2004). 
vii In 1998, the EU and US also signed a Positive Comity Agreement to clarify how positive comity should 
work in practice. Because domestic EU and US laws require competition regulators to initiate 
investigations into mergers that meet certain thresholds, the PCA does not apply to merger cases. 
viii Indeed, the EU allowed US competition officials to attend EU oral hearings as observers in the BMD 
case. 
ix However, reciprocal attendance does not guarantee convergent decisions. For example, see the 1999 
BOC/Air Liquide merger. 
x For more on the MWG, see Damro (2011). 
xi Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98, OJ C 68, 2.3.2001. pp. 3-11. 
 
